THERE was a certain irony in the posting, in 1949, of the 1st Battalion, part of the 40th Infantry Division, to Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, eight years previously, another battalion of the Regiment, also the 1st, had been taken prisoner by the Japanese after a tremendous fight against overwhelming odds. Hong Kong had been occupied by the Japanese and held for nearly four years until they, too, were forced to surrender after a resounding defeat that had sent them crashing to disaster. And now the 1st Middlesex, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Crawford, were back, once again a Regiment of the Line and once again carrying out the traditional task of the Army in peacetime in protecting British interests and possessions throughout the world.
But peace in the Far East was not to last for long. The settlement in Korea, imposed after the war by agreement between the United States and Russia, was wearing thin, and in June, 1950, the North Koreans crossed the frontier into South Korea in force, to plunge that unhappy country into a long, bitter, and devastating war.
There were few who could not read between the lines. South Korea had been under the protection of the United States, North Korea under that of Russia. This new attack was but another facet of the ideological war being waged in the West. It was part of the great plan of disruption and world conquest that filled the dreams of the men who ruled in the Kremlin. The challenge could not be ignored. It was to end wanton aggression that the United Nations had been formed. The new aggression in Korea, then, was to be the test, to prove that the organization of the United Nations was based on no empty words or a useless charter.
The answer was not long delayed. Within a few days the first U.S. division had landed; a few weeks later 27th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier B. A. Coad, D.S.O., and consisting of the 1st Battalion The Middlesex Regiment and the 1st Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, was on its way from Hong Kong.
The 1st Middlesex received only short warning. The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Man, was informed of the forthcoming move to Korea at about 0900 hours on 21st August; on the evening of the 25th the Battalion sailed in the maintenance carrier Unicorn. During those five hectic days the Battalion had to be reorganized into a special establishment of a Headquarters and three rifle companies for the operation, leaving behind all men under nineteen years of age. The Battalion was brought up to strength by reinforcements from the Royal Leicesters, the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, the South Staffordshire Regiment, and the King’s Own Scottish Borderers; the mess silver and other regimental property was deposited in Hong Kong, the camp packed up, and the necessary equipment and stores drawn. On the 24th the Battalion was addressed by General Sir John Harding, then Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, who made a short and pungent speech, reminding all ranks of their splendid and tenacious traditions. The trip in H.M.S. Unicorn was smooth and uneventful, the days at sea being spent mainly in weapon training, P.T., and firing practice. The ship arrived alongside at Pusan at about noon on 29th August and as the Battalion disembarked it was welcomed by the brigade commander, who had flown to Korea in advance, a negro military band, a deputation of South Korean worthies, and a girls’ choir who sang "God Save The King.’’
The situation in the country was grim indeed when the Battalion arrived. It had been impossible to stop the headlong advance of the enemy as they swept across the frontiers in their sudden and unprovoked assault. A fighting withdrawal had brought the North Koreans to a halt on a shorter line embracing only the south-east corner of the country. In this situation 1st Middlesex moved immediately for a destination only just behind the front line in the neighbourhood of Yongsang, south of Taegu. The next few days were spent in shaking down, route marches, weapon training, and field firing. Fortunately the weather was dry and warm and there was no undue hardship during these early days apart from the fact that the Battalion’s transport and stores had not yet arrived.
For operations the 1st Middlesex came under command of the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division. On the night of 31st August! 1st September, the North Koreans crossed the River Naktong in a number of places. This caused Army Headquarters at Taegu to start to withdraw to Pusan and put the Battalion at short notice. Two days later, on 3rd September, the Battalion was moved up into the front line, and on the 4th took over from the 8th Cavalry Regiment-about the equivalent of a British brigade-in a defensive position to the west of Taegu, where the Naktong river turns south. The only road through the sector ran parallel to the front, which was in some places only a few hundred yards away, and in others a mile or so. Frontages were very long, with "D" Company having to hold some 10,000 yards.
In "D" Company’s area and under the command of Major Willoughby were two parties of South Korean police of 140 and 60 men respectively. On the first night the commander of the larger unit, which was nearest Company Headquarters, presented Willoughby with an ultimatum to the effect that he would not stay unless provided with machine guns and given the direct support of British troops amongst them. The police were spread along about two and a half miles of river bank at intervals of about ten yards. Most of them were armed with old Japanese rifles with, at best, two or three rounds each. Major Willoughby compromised by sending them one Bren, taken down and explained to them by C.S.M. Macmillan, for that first night.
The Commanding Officer the next day lent Corporal Fields, the sanitary corporal, and two others from the pioneer platoon to "D" Company. Fields, who had been captured in Hong Kong by the Japanese in 1941, spoke a little of their language. All three rose to the occasion to a remarkable degree, and both police commanders (a captain and a sergeant) were only too glad to take orders from Fields. Major Willoughby therefore put Fields in command and in a frivolous moment named the two units Army Groups "A" and "B." The titles stuck.
The whole length of the front held by United Kingdom forces was over 14 miles and, with the few units then available, the front was naturally very thinly held. Enormous gaps existed between formations and as a result there was a great deal of enemy infiltration. These gaps were plugged as well as possible on an ad hoc basis, but this could not bring the infiltration to a halt. The first action in which the Battalion was concerned was dealing with a strong infiltration which had worked round the Brigade’s left flank and established itself on the high ground in the rear. The area was cleared by a party of South Korean police under the command of Major R. A. Gwyn, assisted by Second-Lieutenant H. J. Evans and a small number of N.C.Os. of the Battalion.
The amphibious landings at Inchon, on the west coast of Korea, were the signal for an advance that was to carry the Battalion right up the country, across the 38th Parallel, and beyond Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. The seizing of the Inchon bridgehead on 20th September was linked with an offensive from the south-east, and almost overnight the whole Korean picture changed. From what had been an unstable front, held only by impromptu plugging of gaps as the enemy attempted to infiltrate, there came a well-timed assault which swept through the enemy almost unhindered, cutting off large areas and raking thousands of North Koreans into the prisoner-of-war cages. It was a breath-taking change in the fortune of war.
Two days before the Battalion crossed the Naktong river on the first stage of the advance, "D" Company commander (Major Willoughby) had established No. 10 Platoon (Lieutenant White) on the far side of the river as a firm base from which No. 12 Platoon (Lieutenant Sobey) led a fighting patrol into enemy territory. Sobey’s patrol got badly shot up when it ran into a party of the enemy in about company strength, but everyone got safely back. White’s platoon remained on the far bank and it was still there when the Battalion got the sudden order to concentrate for the break-out.
At this time also, Lieutenant Jeffrey Bucknall, the Battalion Intelligence Officer, was reported missing. He was evidently on reconnaissance in connection with a projected patrol, as his body was found later near the bank of the Naktong river in the area of the task. His loss was deeply felt, as he was popular with all ranks, a keen and gallant soldier, and a strong member of the Battalion and United Services Rugby XVs.
The Battalion moved forward with the advance as part of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division, and on 21st September crossed the Naktong river by way of a very rickety footbridge, its first task being the capture of two high features on each side of the road which dominated this approach to Sonju. All vehicles and trucks had to be left behind, and M.M.G. and mortars were carried, as also was all ammunition.
After a reconnaissance it was decided to mount an attack the following morning on the right of these two features. Beginning by the side of the road with a comparatively small plum-pudding-shaped hill as a distinct feature, the objective rose increasingly steeply through dwarf fir trees to the summit. The top appeared as a level ridge running parallel to the front and then dropping almost precipitously to open bare country away to the right. "B" Company was given the plum-pudding hill as their objective, and "D" Company was ordered to capture the main feature 950 feet above as the second phase of the operation.
It was decided to mount the attack the following morning. After a quiet night during which the enemy could be heard digging in the hills ahead, a platoon of "B" Company, commanded by Second-Lieutenant Lawrence and supported by two tanks, moved up the road to their company objective. The attack was beautifully executed and Lawrence was awarded the Military Cross for his skill and gallantry on this occasion.
While this attack was in progress, "D" Company, under command of Major Willoughby, moved up to assault the main feature from the right, and farthest, end. After a delay while unco-ordinated artillery fire, entirely unconnected with this operation, was brought under control, "D" Company assaulted across the open, supported by "A" Company, the machine-gun and mortar platoons, and two light tanks. They reached the protection of the dead ground at the foot of the bill without casualties. Sobey’s platoon (No. 12) led up the steep face and reached a knob less than 100 feet from the summit, where they came under heavy fire from the top and were held up.
White’s platoon (No. 10) struck off to the right round the shoulder of the bill and reached the top, where they immediately came under heavy fire from the far end. The platoon sergeant was very soon badly wounded, and White was killed while redisposing his sections the better to engage the enemy. He was posthumously awarded the American Silver Star for his gallant leadership.
By this time it was late afternoon and the enemy were found to be in considerable strength in strong positions at the far end.
Major Rendell ("A" Company) was ordered forward to the support of "D" Company. At this critical moment an American artillery observer arrived to provide the support of medium artillery.
After a short but very concentrated and accurate bombardment the enemy fled and the whole of the objective was occupied without further casualties. Forty enemy dead were found and a quantity of weapons, including four medium machine guns, captured.
The position immediately overlooked another enemy strong-point which was quickly neutralized by artillery and machine. gun fire and the enemy forced to withdraw. That night "D" Company were heavily mortared, and the following morning a weak counter-attack was easily broken up by "A" Company who, following "D" Company, were defending half the hill.
Moving up into Sonju, the Battalion was made responsible for clearing a large area of enemy remnants, and a good haul of prisoners was gathered in. At this time a fourth rifle company arrived from Germany (Queen’s), and also the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment, to join the Brigade, which was now known as Commonwealth Brigade. And here, at last, the battalion transport caught up, bringing with it the many necessities to make life more bearable on active service.
A week later, however, the Battalion was ordered to move up to the 38th Parallel as quickly as possible and was transported by air at night in U.S.A.F. Flying Box Cars from Taegu to Kimpo, bivouacking on the airfield for three days while the transport covered the 225 miles over the most appalling of roads. Just before it arrived, the Battalion was ordered to take up positions near Kaesong. 1,000 yards south of the 38th Parallel, under command of the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division.
Then followed the great advance to the north in pursuit of the broken and defeated army of North Korea. The Battalion crossed the 38th Parallel on 11th October, advancing along roads choked with an endless stream of tanks and trucks and punctuated with burning villages. The Brigadier addressed the Battalion at Kumchon on the 16th and told it that it was to take the lead in the advance on the enemy capital the following day, but the advance developed into a race. There were extraordinary scenes as two American and one South Korean division elbowed each other aside in an attempt to reach Pyongyang first, and it was only with the utmost difficulty that the Commonwealth Brigade was able to maintain its position in the order of march.
The Brigade, as it made its way up to the north, had no tanks, T.C.Vs., artillery, or engineers of its own. It was entirely dependent on the Americans and could only get what the division to which it was attached could spare. The Americans, in this respect, rarely failed to produce all that was asked for, but at times, naturally enough, they were unable to give the Brigade everything that it required.
More extraordinary still was the lack of any attempt to mop up the area during this headlong advance. Huge dumps of enemy arms and equipment were left unguarded and, when the armoured avalanche had passed, groups of enemy by-passed were able to re-equip themselves and operate against lines of communication.
There was little opposition during this headlong rush to the north. Pyongyang was reached on 21st October, where the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division was ordered to halt, but the Commonwealth Brigade was placed under command of 24th U.S. Division and ordered to push on by itself, directed on Sinanju, which was reached on the 23rd. The Division, in fact, did not catch up with the Brigade for another two days.
The bridge over the Chongchon river just beyond Sinanju was down, and the Battalion was ordered to lead the Brigade in an assault of the river the next morning. In order to gain surprise it was decided to make the crossing four miles down-stream, where the river narrowed slightly. At this point it was about 800 yards wide, with an approach over open paddy of a further 1,000 yards and with low hills on the far side.
The assault, fortunately, was unopposed, for there had been no intelligence about the rate of tide and current and the companies became widely separated during the crossing. Also the Battalion had neither M.M.G., mortar, nor artillery support, and all heavy equipment had to be left on the near bank and could not be brought up till next day. The first two companies got across in good order, but unfortunately the last of the assault boats in which the third company crossed grounded in mid-river and the rear half of the company had to be dragged ashore one by one through the thick black mud. The fourth company fared even worse, for by now the tide was racing out and the river became a mass of small mud islands. Eventually, however, the company managed to struggle ashore and the Battalion occupied defensive positions covering the main bridge from Sinanju. With the equipment on the other bank were all its blankets and rations, so that the night of the 24th was far from comfortable.
On the 26th the 1 st Middlesex was ordered forward again to reach the main west road some four miles beyond Sinanju. To do this a tributary of the Chongchon river had then to be crossed. No bridge existed and the Battalion crossed it in tanks. That night the 1st Middlesex was alone, four miles ahead of any other unit of the Eighth Army on the north-west axis.
The road was reached by nightfall and just before midnight the transport arrived with food and bedding rolls. In spite of fairly severe shelling from self-propelled guns during the night, there were no casualties.
Early the following morning the 1st Middlesex continued the advance to capture its objective, known by the code name of "Frog." This was a hill feature dominating the important junction of the Chongju and Taechon roads. There was a good deal of opposition from infantry and T.34 tanks during the advance, causing some casualties, but an air-strike and medium artillery softened up the position sufficiently for the Battalion to capture it without difficulty. On 30th October it carried out a wide outflanking movement through densely wooded hills to occupy a feature that dominated the town of Chongju, thus securing the right flank of the Argylls for the initial assault on the town.
The 1st Middlesex had now spent sixty-two days in active operations and was due for a few days’ rest. It had been a time of constant movement by day and night, sometimes against determined rear-guard parties, supported by tanks and self-propelled guns. Together with the Argylls, the Battalion moved, on 1st November, to Taechon as Corps reserve for a period of make and mend for body, soul, and vehicles, and above all a period of baths, sleep, and clean clothes.
It seemed that the war was over, for the enemy appeared to have disintegrated and fallen back over his northern border. That there would be a long period of mopping up, of collecting abandoned war materials, and of rounding-up by-passed units who might give a certain amount of trouble, was fairly apparent to all, but any further serious fighting seemed unlikely.
The 1st November passed quietly, with the Battalion making the most of its rest period. On 2nd November rumour began to spread through the bivouac area that all was not well to the northward, and that the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division had been badly surprised. Later in the day the rumour became certainty when an American Regimental Combat team was met retreating, with a report that part of the 1st Cavalry Division had been attacked and badly cut up by Chinese forces advancing across the Yalu river on the borders of Manchuria. Events then began to move fast and, later still on the 2nd, the Battalion was put at thirty minutes’ notice to move to Sumchon, fifty miles south of the Chongchon river. This seemed a strange portent for an army on the threshold of victory.
By the afternoon of the 2nd the Battalion and the Argylls found themselves alone on the north-west axis with reports from local villagers that a large force of Chinese was converging on Taechon. There was no transport for a withdrawal, and as a result plans were made to pull back on foot on the morning of the 3rd along the only road still open, that which ran along the front to "Frog." Early on the 3rd the Battalion moved off, and as the last company cleared the town the Chinese entered it from the west.
After eight miles of hitch-hiking, transport was met and Pakchon was reached during the evening. Here it was learned that the Commonwealth Brigade was to act as a rear-guard, defending the roads leading into the town to allow elements of the 1st U.S. Cavalry Division to withdraw through the Brigade. Accordingly the Battalion occupied positions north and east of the town, with the other two units of the Brigade remaining west of the river.
Guy Fawkes’ Day dawned with the artillery in the rear of the brigade position defending itself from a determined Chinese thrust designed to cut the Brigade’s only supply route and link to the bridge at Anju, to the south of which all the United Nations units in the north-west of Korea were re-forming. By noon the situation was becoming serious and, in the absence of orders, the Brigade commander decided to pull back the Argylls and the Australians from the west of the river to the high ground immediately north of Chongchon. While the Australians put in an attack to halt the Chinese thrust, the remainder of the Brigade, with "A" Company of the 1st Middlesex as rear-guard, moved south out of Pakchon to occupy the high ground north of the river. It was discovered that the Chinese had already established themselves on this feature, but they were dislodged by air-burst artillery fire and the hills occupied by the Brigade.
After a noisy and disturbed night the Chinese withdrew and the Battalion took part in a series of deliberate and limited advances, edging northwards to enlarge the bridgehead over the River Chongchon.
Winter came in suddenly while the Battalion was occupying these hilltops and within an hour the temperature had dropped to 22 degrees of frost. So suddenly had it come that there had been no time to issue winter clothing and the men were still in tropical kit.
By 16th November the 1St Middlesex had returned to Pakchon and were occupying positions north of the town. The second MacArthur offensive was mounted on 24th November and once again American troops advanced towards the north. though this time cautiously on foot. The advance northwards was in two great prongs, one directed on the hydro-electric reservoirs near the Yalu river, the other making for the north-west corner of North Korea. Between them there was a large gap.
Early in the morning of 27th November the Commonwealth Brigade was transferred to the 9th U.S. Corps and moved across the River Chongchon and then east to the area of Corps Head-quarters at Kunuri. It was a bitter morning with a cruel north wind driving clouds of frozen yellow dust along the road, and as the Battalion crossed the river, ice-floes were beginning to pile up against the piers of the improvised bridge.
On arrival at Kunuri it was discovered that the offensive had come to an abrupt stop and that once again the army was in retreat. Down through the gap between the two prongs of the offensive came Chinese troops from the Manchurian border. According to American Intelligence at Corps Headquarters, the Chinese were estimated at over 1,000,000, but this figure was wildly exaggerated and, in fact, can hardly have amounted to much more than about 50,000. They had very little M.T. and were mostly dependent on mules, but nevertheless their advance outflanked the right of the 9th U.S. Corps and forced a retreat.
Once again the Brigade was to take up the role of rear-guard, holding the roads as the retreating Americans passed through. With Corps Headquarters pushing back rapidly to Chasan, thirty miles to the south, the Brigade followed on foot, no transport again being available. On the way the Battalion passed through a long, tortuous pass that climbed and looped its way through the mountains.
On 29th November the 1St Middlesex at last reached Chasan, the rear company arriving at 3 a.m. on the 30th. Six hours later the Battalion was on the move again, having marched eighteen miles that night and having had only four hours’ rest in a frozen rice-field. It was ordered to move back the way it had come and hold the pass through which it had only just moved. The orders were to search the area of the pass, and in particular the villages, and bring in any suspicious characters. One company was then to remain and hold the pass as a patrolling base while the 2nd U.S. Division passed through.
The Battalion moved back towards the pass through deserted villages and along the empty road up the valley. A wireless message was received that the enemy were now known to be ahead and the warning was passed up and down the column. The Battalion reached the hills and directly ahead of them climbed the empty and silent road through the pass, disappearing after a few hundred yards and then reappearing as it climbed in a long scar across the mountains. The leading
company moved forward again to secure a hill at the top of the pass.
The silence was broken by five American fighters which swung low over the hills and machine-gunned the wooded slopes ahead of the troops. They were followed by a few rifle shots, and then the steady sound of a Bren in reply. The leading company pressed up the hill to its objective. Over the intervening ground came the sound of bursting mortar bombs and the harsh, unmistakable noise of a Russian machine gun. The sound of the Vickers guns joined the chorus, to be followed in a few moments by the noise of the Battalion’s mortars.
In the distance a small cloud of dust could be seen on the road through the pass. It revealed itself as a jeep, driven furiously from side to side. The slopes above it came to life with the flashes of rifle fire, but still the jeep came on. It disappeared behind the shoulder of a hill. There was a further burst of fire, and then silence.
Another company was preparing to pass through the leading company in order to occupy positions still farther ahead when the storm broke. Without warning rifle shots came from the hills on the flanks of the rear companies, to be followed almost at once by mortar fire. Every ridge and peak in the vicinity seemed to be occupied by the enemy. Mortaring became general and machine guns joined in with the rifle fire from above. The Battalion was alone, expected to hold open the escape route for a division, and the nearest troops who could possibly support it were the remaining two battalions of the Brigade, a full twenty miles to the rear. To make matters worse, wireless communications with the Brigade commander had broken down.
"A" Company, the leading company, was by now under accurate and sustained machine-gun fire and casualties were mounting. At this critical moment wireless communications with Brigade Headquarters were re-established and the Battalion was ordered to disengage and occupy a "stop" position astride the road in a village eight miles to the southward. This extremely difficult operation was successfully achieved, the rear company leaving only after a hand-to-hand fight with a Chinese platoon. The night was spent in a defensive position in a village. Early in the morning, an order was received to return to the pass and to hold it, with the promised aid of tanks and a battery of 105-mm. guns, while the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division withdrew through it.
All was quiet again when the pass was reached and the Battalion occupied positions astride the road without opposition. It looked as though the enemy had withdrawn and hopes were high that the Americans would be able to come through unmolested. Then a few tanks and jeeps were seen racing down the road, disappearing and then reappearing round the bend in a fusilade of shots. They reached the Battalion’s positions with many wounded and dead.
A few minutes later a long nose-to-tail column was seen at the top of the pass. It seemed endless as it wound down the road, the head of it disappearing round the shoulder of the mountain that hid the lower part of the road. Then it stopped and from the hills on either side poured a stream of gun fire from all types of weapons. A few vehicles managed to pass the halted columns and some of them got through, but in a short time the column was double banked and nothing was able to move.
Many of the passengers managed to make their way out on foot, and the wounded were passed back to the regimental aid posts so far as was possible with the limited transport available. By 4 p.m. the pass was quiet again and the stream of survivors had stopped. The Battalion was ordered back to Chasan, which was reached that night, having had to fight its way out of the pass to reach safety. At the last, the 105-mm. guns were firing over open sights and the rear link vehicle was knocked out.
On arrival at Chasan it was found that the United Nations forces were once again in full retreat, this time to Pyongyang. An attempt was made to form a delaying line just north of the city, the Commonwealth Brigade being employed to extend the line south-eastward. It was, however, held for no more than twenty-four hours, and on 3rd December, after holding two intermediate positions and losing certain vehicles in a road-block (including its office truck with all the Christmas cards!), the 1st Middlesex moved back with the 9th U.S. Corps towards the 38th Parallel. This was finally crossed on the 11th. By the afternoon of that day the Battalion settled into a reserve area in the foothills immediately north of Uijongbu.
The next three weeks were spent in this area, a small shanty" town springing up overnight in the battalion area. The cold was still bitter, and the shelter provided by these rapidly erected dwellings was more than welcome. Christmas Day passed without any interference from the enemy and was celebrated in fine style, due largely to a magnificent achievement by the Battalion’s cooks and the overwhelming kindness of so many people in Hong Kong and Britain, whose many parcels and gifts made possible a really pleasant Christmas. It came as something of a surprise to the Battalion to realize that, although it was serving in so remote a part of the world, it was still cherished in the hearts of those at home.
After Christmas the number of enemy troops north of the Parallel was known to be increasing and the 1st Middlesex prepared for further battle. The Chinese attacked on New Year’s Day, and at 6.30 in the morning the Battalion was ordered to move north and take up positions through which the South Korean divisions could withdraw. But on this occasion there was to be no serious fighting. After the South Koreans had passed through, the Battalion edged back, company by company, and by daybreak on the 2nd was concentrated with the remainder of the Brigade as corps reserve among the bombed-out schoolhouses and buildings in the northern out-skirts of Seoul.
The situation, which was reasonably stable on the 2nd, deteriorated rapidly on the 3rd, when the Chinese broke through to the north-east of the city. The 1st Middlesex were ordered to take up a rear-guard position to cover the retreat of the main forces through Seoul and across the Han river. The plan required the Brigade to hold the high mountains north of the city and keep open the Uijongbu-Seoul road while the 9th U.S. Corps passed through, and it fell to the 1st Middlesex to occupy the highest peak in the range and about three-quarters of the ridge. These positions were reached with great difficulty just as darkness fell, and the Battalion spent a most uncomfortable night in the bitter cold, with the thermometer a long way below zero.
The 9th U.S. Corps passed through during the night and early morning of the 4th, and at 8 a.m. the 1st Middlesex was withdrawn from the mountain positions to the outskirts of Seoul. Here it joined a mixed transport column of tanks, trucks, and carriers, and eventually moved off through the deserted city and crossed the Han river. In the early afternoon it reached the walled city of Suwon, turned east to Ichon, and then south again to a harbour area twenty-five miles beyond Changhowan-Ni.
The Battalion remained in this area for almost a month, the Brigade acting as corps reserve, and carrying out long-range patrols in the vast expanse of "No-man’s Land" ahead of it. During January the 16th Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery, joined, the first time the Brigade had had its own artillery since the beginning of the campaign. The New Zealand battery allotted to the 1st Middlesex very quickly settled down with the Battalion, becoming almost an integral part of it, and a firm friendship soon developed between the two units.
On 1st February two companies were moved about twenty-five miles eastward to just south of Yoju, and the remainder of the Battalion joined them the next day. All that was left of Yoju was a waste of rubble, ashes, and twisted corrugated iron. A river, which at that time was ice-covered, comes up from the south, flows east and west past the town, and then turns north again.
The remainder of the Brigade arrived in the area two days later and defensive positions were dug along the river bank. At this stage it was difficult to discover what exactly was happening in Korea, so unreliable was the general level of Intelligence, although there were occasionally alarming reports of almost astronomical numbers of Chinese massing for another offensive.
On 12th February the enemy was reported to be making headway in a drive down central Korea and directed on Wonju, some thirty miles east of the Battalion’s position. A road-block was set up on the main road south from Chipyong-Ni, about fifteen miles north of Yoju, and this was manned by American, mostly negro, troops. Chipyong-Ni itself was held by an American Regimental Combat Team which included a French battalion, and had been cut off and invested. On 14th February the Commonwealth Brigade, with the 1st Middlesex leading, was ordered up to reinforce the road-block. About half-way there the sound of firing could be heard up the valley, and a number of American wounded came down the road with a report that a recce company holding the cross-roads some six miles up the valley had been surprised and overrun.
The Battalion advanced, with "B" and "C" Companies out on the flanks, searching the ridges on either side of the valley, while "A" and "D" Companies with support weapons moved up the road. After two hours of this advance, a number of men were seen digging in on a solitary feature in the middle of the valley. At first they were thought to be Americans, but a more careful examination through glasses showed them to be Chinese. They were engaged by artillery and mortars and the majority of them went to ground.
The enemy were driven off the crest by an attack put in by "A" Company (Major Dowse), well supported by "D" Company. But on reaching the crest it was discovered to be the southerly end of a long, deeply-ravined spine about 900 yards long. A series of quick outflanking moves by "A" Company forced the enemy to retreat from spur to spur and by last light the Battalion reached the final crest. The flanking companies were called in and the whole Battalion consolidated in a strong defensive position for the night.
Stand-to was ordered at 4 a.m. and an hour later the Chinese launched their counter-attack, supported by mortars and machine guns and blowing bugles and small tin trumpets. The main attacks, which came in waves, fell on "A" and "D" Companies, who were on the northern end of the ridge. The right flank platoon of "A" Company was overrun after it had run out of ammunition, but managed to pull back on to the higher ground and continue the fight. One section was taken prisoner, but succeeded in breaking free from their captors later in the morning after the attack had been driven off and returning to the battalion position. For some time there was hand-to-hand fighting, but in the end the Chinese had had enough and retreated, leaving behind twelve prisoners and forty-eight dead. The Battalion’s casualties were very light.
The retreat of the enemy had opened the westerly road to Chipyong-Ni, and by the 14th convoys were using it without interruption.
The Brigade was here brought up to a strength of four battalions by the arrival of the Princess Patricia’s Light Infantry from Canada, and on 18th February the advance was continued in a blizzard, with the 1st Middlesex again in the lead. The Battalion edged forward among the mountains. Occasionally there was some attempted resistance on the brigade front, but it was rarely more than spasmodic, and slowly the line was straightened out and the Chinese pushed back. The country through which the advance was made was bleak in the extreme, consisting mainly of razor-backed hills and deep rocky valleys. Through it all the Korean winter spread a bitter, unrelenting cold which chilled everyone to the bone. It was a slow, heart-breaking business, but gradually the final objectives came into sight. By 4th March they were within reach, and on the following day the Brigade at last stood on the heights it had been set to capture. Relieved on 13th March, all the battalions were able to go back a little way into reserve for a few days of much-needed rest and refit.
It was while the Battalion was in reserve that it learned that Lieutenant-Colonel Man was to relinquish command. He had been commanding the Brigade on and off during the absence of Brigadier Coad on leave, and Major R. A. Gwyn, Second-in-Command, had taken over the duties of Commanding Officer. Gwyn himself went sick in March and the Battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson, of the Royal Warwicks, who arrived a few days later.
On 25th March, 27th Commonwealth Brigade was placed under command of the 24th U.S. Division and ordered to move up to the general area of Taerori-Ri, in the valley of the Chujong-Chon, a tributary of the Pukhan Gang. The approach march was some thirty miles and, although much of the road was fair, it was not until after midnight that the Battalion reached its concentration area.
The task that lay in front of the Brigade, which had now been taken over by Brigadier B. A. Burke, D.S.O., was to open up the valley of the Chujong-Chon, while two combat teams of the 24th Division operated similarly on the left and the right. The method of advance was that so frequently to be found in Korea, the moving of two companies simultaneously along parallel ridges of high ground dominating the valley and then leap-frogging the reserve companies through.
The operation began on 28th March, with the 1st Middlesex leading the Brigade to its first objectives. These were reached without difficulty, and on the 29th the Australians passed through, directed on to the second objectives. They met with some opposition from a strong Chinese rear-guard and the Australians had to ask for assistance, "C" Company moving up to help and being mortared on the way.
As the advance moved slowly up the valley the ground became more difficult, developing into an area of razor-back ridges, with precipitous drops on either side. The Chinese were in very strong positions, dug in on several spurs which over-looked the approach routes, and it was obviously going to be a difficult task to dislodge them.
On 31st March the 1st Middlesex was again in the lead, its objective being a craggy peak surmounted by a long, spiny ridge, and given the code-name "Oak." The approach was along another spine, and it was apparent that any attack would have to be made on a very narrow front. As a result the M.M.G. platoon was brought up to give fire support, and as soon as they were in position "D" Company edged forward and got to within 300 yards of its objective unseen. Here it attempted to deploy, but without success, owing to the impossible nature of the ground. When the leading sections opened fire with their Bren guns they were answered by a storm of fire from light automatics and one heavier calibre gun. As dusk was approaching and it was obvious that "Oak"  as held in force, the Commanding Officer ordered "D" Company to withdraw and harbour for the night.
    Early the following morning the Commanding Officer called for an air-strike on "Oak," which was supplemented by the fire support of the M.M.G. platoon. As soon as it was over a platoon of "D" Company clambered up the crag, to find that the Chinese had fled. The feature was successfully occupied by 0700 hours and the first stage of the operation was completed.
Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson arrived to take over the command as the, Battalion regrouped for the second stage of the attack. For this the Brigade side-stepped into a similar valley to the east, to be confronted with an almost exactly similar task. Again companies advanced along the ridges on either side until, once more, they reached the rocky mountainous barrier at the head of the valley. For the next six days the Battalion was engaged in a long and tiresome attack on the four hill features that dominated the head of the valley. They were defended stubbornly by the Chinese, who had dug in on the crests and prepared immensely strong positions for defence. Other handicaps, almost as stubborn as the Chinese, were the wintry weather, the falling snow often reducing visibility to as little as five yards, and the difficult ground, which rarely offered any chance for companies to deploy properly and usually called for an attack along the narrow axis provided by a rocky footpath, with supporting mortar and artillery fire.
It was not until 16th April that the four features were finally secured by the Brigade. On the following day the Battalion was moved into corps reserve.
As the 1st Middlesex waited in its rest area at Kapyong for the arrival of the 1st King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, who were expected to relieve it, the news from the front took a turn for the worse. The Chinese were massing for their spring offensive, and on 23rd April there came a report of a six-mile retreat by one of the South Korean divisions. The Brigade was immediately brought to the alert, and on 24th April the Battalion was ordered up to the road junction at Sobom-Ni to cover the New Zealand gunners. On the way up it became apparent that something had gone seriously wrong, for the roads were choked with retreating South Korean soldiers. By evening the situation was deteriorating rapidly and reports were received that there was a general withdrawal down the main valley to the north-east of Kwanani-Ni which, if followed up rapidly by the enemy, was capable of cutting off the 1st Middlesex and the New Zealand Field Regiment. The brigadier decided to withdraw this small force and in the meantime to deploy the Australians and Canadians to cover the vital road junction.
By midnight the Australians reported that the enemy was infiltrating with the retreating South Koreans, and events moved quickly. The Chinese took every advantage of the darkness and the confusion caused by the stragglers and pressed home a series of strong attacks against the Australians’ centre. At 0530 hours on the 25th the Commanding Officer was asked to send a company forward to assist the Australians, and ten minutes later "D" Company was on its way. Almost immediately it came under small-arms and mortar fire. The Australian C.O., who met it on its way up, asked the company commander to occupy a low ridge on the left, as he was afraid of encirclement.
"D" Company immediately crossed the road through a rain of tracer fire and raced up to seize the ridge, No sooner had the first platoon arrived than the enemy appeared on the next ridge, which was about 75 yards away and some 50 feet higher.
A vicious fire fight developed. The enemy were moving extraordinarily well and with great dash, supported by a light mortar and a captured American recoilless gun, which they were using over open sights. "D" Company, which had been ordered up in light order, had only one 2-inch mortar with them, which the C.S.M. got into action, but the first bomb broke the firing-pin, and thereafter it was rifle, L.M.G., and grenades. The latter were used to great effect by Sergeant Bartholomew, who dispersed an attempted attack by crawling North Koreans who were trying to take his platoon in the flank. By this time dawn was beginning to break and the enemy could be seen working their way round the left flank in an attempt to cut the road. The recoilless gun had claimed its first casualties by scoring a direct hit and knocking out a complete section of No. 10 Platoon.
The Commanding Officer, having heard "D" Company commander’s report, ordered him to fight the company out and rejoin the Battalion. The road was now firmly held by the enemy, and as it was evident that any attempt to use it would result in substantial casualties, Major Nolda decided to cut across the valley in a north-easterly direction and to attempt to rejoin by making a wide detour. After a prodigious walk across the mountain, involving a much wider detour than had been envisaged, the company rejoined the Battalion, tired and hungry but in excellent spirits, and bringing with it all its wounded. For his gallantry in the action on the ridge, Lieutenant Read was subsequently awarded the M.C.
During the day the enemy continued his attack relentlessly and the brigadier ordered the Australians to withdraw through the Battalion. The withdrawal was successfully completed by 2250 hours, and although it meant surrendering the road junction to the enemy, his victory had only been bought at terrific cost. It was estimated that over 800 casualties had been suffered
by the Chinese and the action had so much delayed their off offensive that the threatened break-through was successfully prevented.
Attacks continued all through the day and night of the 25th, but by now they were beginning to lose their punch. Nevertheless, a setback to the adjacent division caused a slow withdrawal all along the central front, the Brigade acting as rear-guard. It was a dispiriting and tiring time, and it was with considerable relief that the Battalion was at last withdrawn for a short rest period in the area of Yangyong.
On 24th April the 1st Middlesex advance party left Korea for Hong Kong, but there was still to be one more task for the Battalion before its relief arrived. The Chinese offensive had, as yet, not spent itself and it was anticipated that the next thrust would not be launched direct at Seoul but would develop as a wide circling movement directed on the high ground to the north-east, which provided a bastion for the open plains. In order to counter such a move, a great weight of artillery and men were concentrated in this area with orders to fortify it and hold it at all costs.
With the forthcoming attack considered imminent, the Battalion was sent up to the front again, with orders to erect such defences as were possible in the time available. As it turned out, the Chinese attack did not develop for another three weeks.
For the next ten days the 1st Middlesex worked feverishly, digging, wiring, and patrolling. Each day the defences grew stronger and, as was eventually proved, the position in fact was made impregnable. This was the first time in the history of the Eighth Army in Korea that a proper defensive position was established. Elaborate minefields were laid and, when all was finished, there was no doubt at all that any attack, however sacrificial in numbers, could be very easily beaten off.
On 10th May the news was received that the 1st King’s Shropshire Light Infantry had actually sailed from Hong Kong and were on their way. On the 12th the Battalion was relieved in the line and by that afternoon had moved to its last assembly area in Korea, on the Han river.
At dusk the following day the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry arrived, to be given a great welcome from the Battalion. But there was little time for more than a brief hail and farewell,
for the transport that brought the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry up took the 1st Middlesex back, bound for the port of Inchon. It was an uncomfortable ride, the negro drivers going "hell for leather" down the dusty roads in an attempt to reach Inchon before midnight, but there were few who complained about the discomfort or the speed. Ahead of them lay Hong Kong, and a real chance at last to clean up and to rest after the long and arduous months of Korean warfare.
The Battalion embarked in the United States L.S.I. Montrail on the morning of 14th May. As the ship sailed the rails were crowded with men intent on getting the last glimpses of the country in which they had fought. The coastline faded into the distance and there was a silence and a general feeling of sadness as all ranks recalled the many who had set out with the Battalion nine months earlier and who would not be returning.
So ended the Korean campaign for the Battalion. It had been a testing time, a story of swift advance and swift retreat, of vast distances covered, of grim, bitter battles against a resolute and resourceful enemy, of hardship and endurance in terrible conditions of climate and terrain, of courage and sacrifice, and a noble devotion to duty. Once again a battalion of the Middlesex Regiment had lived up to its proud traditions of service. In the words of the Commonwealth Division History, "The ‘Die-Hards’ had fought in the manner expected of them during the early, and most difficult, months of the campaign."